The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus Part Two: On the Need for Adaptation to Changing Reality by Scheflin, Alan & Miller, Arthur Selwyn
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1967
The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the
Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus Part Two:
On the Need for Adaptation to Changing Reality
Alan Scheflin
Santa Clara University School of Law, ascheflin@scu.edu
Arthur Selwyn Miller
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Alan Scheflin and Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State: A Preliminary Excursus Part Two:
On the Need for Adaptation to Changing Reality , 1967 Duke L.J. 522 (1967),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/683
THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AGE OF THE POSITIVE STATE:
A PRELIMINARY EXCURSUS-
Part Two: On the Need for Adaptation to Changing
Reality
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER*
ALAN W. SCHEFLINt
Government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not un-
der the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic
life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified
by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its functions
by the sheer pressure of life.... Living political constitutions
must be Darwinian in structure and practice.
-Woodrow Wilson$
INTRODUCTION
N Part One of this article,' three hypotheses which, of necessity,
were unsupported by empirical foundation, 2 were tentatively ad-
vanced in an attempt to suggest some ways of thinking about the
institutional position of the United States Supreme Court.8 It was
noted that a priori assertions about the Court and its power are
wholly inadequate and that scholarship must go beyond the confines
of judicial opinions if a full understanding of America's peculiar
* A.B. 1938, Willamette University; LL.B. 1949, Stanford Law School; J.S.D. 1959,
Yale Law School. Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
t BA. 1963, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1966, The George Washington University
Law School; LL.M. 1967, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown
Law Center.
TWILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57 (1908).
Miller & Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive
State: A Preliminary Excursus (pt. 1), 1967 DuKE L.J. 273.
"A modest survey of students of the Supreme Court revealed that no studies de-
veloping the necessary empirical data were known to exist. See id. at 301-20 (Ap-
pendix).
S The hypotheses are as follows: (1) The prestige of the Supreme Court has little
or nothing to do with its symbolic role, but rather with what it does (id. at 281-83);
(2) The Supreme Court has power to the extent that it articulates deep-set values
(preferences) of the American people (id. at 283-88); and (3) The Supreme Court has
power to the extent to which the avowedly political branches of government affirma-
tively respond to the norm announced by the Court (id. at 288-94).
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contribution to the science of government is to be developed. In
short, a sociology of constitutional adjudication is needed.
In this part of the article, attention is directed to three proposi-
tions concerning the need for the Supreme Court to adapt itself to
the exigencies of changing reality if it is to retain (or regain) what-
ever power it has (or may have had). While these propositions are
not intended to follow from the prior hypotheses as a matter of
inexorable logic, they are related to and are not inconsistent with
what has been said before. Taken together, with the reminder that
much more factual data is required, they indicate the need for adapta-
tion to the demands brought on by a rapidly changing society.4
The propositions hereinafter discussed include the following: (1)
Outward or ostensible adherence to the declaratory theory of law is
not necessary for the integrity and continuing viability of the
constitutional adjudicatory process; (2) The adversary system is not
adequate to the needs of the Court; and (3) The Court in the-years
ahead must direct itself to the problems of a changing social milieu.
A FIRsT PROPOSrrION
The first proposition may be stated as follows: Adherence to the
declaratory theory of law is probably not necessary for the integrity
and viability of the constitutional adjudicatory process. We say
"probably" because we know of no hard "evidence" to validate or
invalidate the statement. However, the assertion seems to be a fair
conclusion deducible from the flow of Supreme Court decisions in
recent decades and bolstered by the observation that at those times
when the Court has ostensibly adhered to the declaratory theory (for
example, during the early years of the New Deal) its position has
been threatened.5 Moreover, if as Professors Mishkin and Morris
maintain in On Law in Courts,6 the declaratory theory is dead, some
'Change is built into the American social structure. Compare LAPP, THE NEW
PRESTHOOD: THE SCENTIFIC ELME AND TE USE OF POWER (1965), with PRICE, Tim
SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965), 1966 DuKE L.J. 622. See Miller, Notes on the Concept of the
"Living" Constitution, 31 GEo. WASH. L. R v. 881 (1963), and Miller, Technology,
Social Change, and the Constitution, 33 GRo. WASH. L. Rzv. 17 (1964), for discussions
of the factor of change as it relates to the Constitution.
5 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Butler and similar cases in-
validating New Deal legislation led to the Court packing plan of 1937.
6MISHKIN 8: MoRms, ON LAW IN COURTS 57 (1965). The roots of the declaratory
theory can be traced back to Flaundres and Wife v. Rycheman, Y. B. Hill. 18 & 19
Edw. 3, p1. 3 (1344-45), in PIKE, YEAR BOOKS OF THE REIGN OF KING EDWARD III, YEA.S
18 AND 19, at 374, 378 (1905), in which a lawyer argued "I think you will do as others
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additional support for the above proposition is available. As Pro-
fessor Wolfgang Friedmann has asserted, "The Blackstonian doc-
trine of the 'declaratory' function of the courts, holding that the
duty of the court is not to 'pronounce a new law but to maintain
and expound the old one,' has long been little more than a ghost."
The decline of the declaratory theory permits attention to be di-
verted "from the stale controversy over whether judges make law to
the much more complex and controversial question of the limits of
judicial lawmaking." 8
Nevertheless, it is evident that the declaratory theory continues
to obscure legal scholarship by providing the standard by which
judicial decisions are often evaluated. The reasoning of judges,
which has long fascinated lawyers and students of the judiciary, has
been the subject of numberless written comments. Most of what is
printed in legal periodicals today, for example, may be said to consist
of efforts to analyze the manner in which judges reach decisions.
Very often, the net conclusion of such writings is that the judge
reached the correct result but for the wrong reasons., The author
then proceeds to set forth what seem to him to be better reasons.
This is exegesis upon judicial texts, casuistry about what judges say
are their reasons for decisions. Lawyers, particularly law professors
who follow the Supreme Court, seize upon the newly issued opinions
of that tribunal and then, in heavily footnoted scholarly disputations,
gnaw over what the Justices say. The commentators are apparently
more interested in the method than the result. Not so the layman,
who either for reasons of indifference or because of innate canniness
apparently ignores the opinions and looks to the results.
Similarly, the usual law school casebook or textbook makes little
or no reference to the "policy" aspects of legal decisions or the law-
making proclivities of judges. Witness also the activities of the
American Law Institute which purports to "restate" legal doctrine in
a series of black-letter propositions, presumably to aid judges in
have done in the same case, or else we do not know what the law is." Judge Hillary
answered, "It is the will of the Justice" but Chief Justice Stonore broke in and said,
"No; law is that which is right." See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623
n.7 (1965).
.
T Friedmann, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 29 MoDERN
L. REv. 593 (1966).
8 Id. at 595.
9 Illustrations are legion. For a recent example, see Horowitz & Karst, The Proposi-
tion Fourteen Cases: Justice in Search of a Justification, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 37 (1966).
[V/ol. 1967:522
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finding and declaring the law a U Blackstone. While it is, as Pro-
fessor Friedmann asserts,10 an exercise in sterility to debate the
question of judicial creativity, an explanation of the operation and
basis of the declaratory theory is necessary to round out the develop-
ment of this article.
According to Blackstone, the judge is "sworn to determine, not
according to his own private judgment, but according to the known
laws and customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new
law, but to maintain and expound the old one."" Only in this way,
according to the theory, can the litigants, and society at large, be
assured that the same acts will be treated the same way and that, in
essence, reliance may be placed on law.' 2 If law is to be a guiding
principle in society and the matrix within which the affairs of men
may be legitimately conducted, it must be obeyed, and "to be obeyed
or followed, must be known; to be known it must be fixed; to be
fixed, what is decided today must be followed tomorrow."' 3 The
declaratory theory posits the principle of stare decisis as the only
effective means for maintaining stability in the legal system, protect-
ing reliance, and checking judicial caprice by restricting the limits
within which the judge may operate.
The declaratory theory also is said to serve another useful func-
tion. Professor Mishkin has stated that, as a symbolic expression of
the judicial process, it accounts in large measure for the prestige of
the courts. There is, he asserts, a "strongly held and deeply felt
belief that judges are bound by a body of fixed, overriding law, that
they apply that law impersonally as well as impartially, that they
exercise no individual choice and have no program of their own to.
advance.' 4 However, whatever role the symbolic conception plays
10 Friedmann, supra note 7, at 595.
22 I BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 069. Compare BACON, OF JUDICATURE: "Judges
ought to remember, that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law,
and not to make law, or give law. Else will it be like the authority, claimed by
the Church of Rome, which under pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick
to add or alter, and to pronounce that which they do not find; and by show of
antiquity, to introduce novelty."12 This position appears to be the main thrust of Professor Lon Fullers' eight prin-
ciples of legality. See FuL.mt, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-39 (1964).
18 Kaufman, A Defense of Stare Decisis, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 283, 284 (1959).
14Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, 79 HARv. L. Rv. 56, 62 (1965). For another criticism of Professor Mishkin's
article, see Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 719 (1966).
Thurman Arnold maintains that "the ideal of a government of laws rather than
Vol. 1967: 522]
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in the relationship between the public and the law as announced in
courts, surely there is a negative side to it. Even if it could be
demonstrated that the symbol is valuable, it obviously conceals truth.
Merely by being a symbol, it necessarily obscures the real foundation
of what is symbolized. Nevertheless, Professor Mishkin maintains
that if the declaratory theory "be in part myth, it is a myth by which
we live and which can be sacrificed only at substantial cost."'1
While acknowledging that the truth behind the symbol ought not
be obscured to anyone wishing to learn and taking the trouble to
understand, he goes on to say:
At the same time, I see no affirmative virtue in the destruction of
essentially sound and valuable symbols in order to promulgate, a
part of a more sophisticated-and indeed over-all more accurate-
general view. Such partial truths do not necessarily represent a
gain in wisdom over the more elementary general view, and the
destruction of the symbol does involve real loss. Though I know
that judges are human and quite distinct individuals, I am
not in favor of their doffing their robes, for I think there is value
in stressing, for themselves and for others, the quite real striving
for an impartiality I know can never be fully achieved.16
The trouble with this position is multiple. First, it assumes that
truth about the judiciary (whatever it may be) can be kept from the
people at large. As education spreads and as the mass media reach
into every home, that assumption is dubious at best. Second, where
does an elite, however defined, acquire its warrant or license to keep
the truth from others?' 7 Third, it is difficult to grasp what "real
men is a necessary one. Briefs could not be written before a court on any other premise.
This very simple ideal is essential to the public acceptance of our judicial system
and to all steps in the judicial process." Letter from Thurman Arnold to Arthur
S. Miller, March 23, 1966 (quoted with permission). However, briefs could not be
written before an appellate court on any other premise than that the law is sufficiently
uncertain to permit opposing arguments. See Miller, On the Choice of Major Premises
in Supreme Court Opinions, 14 J. Pua. L. 251 (1965).
5 Mishkin, supra note 14.
16 Id. at 63 n.29.
17 For, "in the long run . . . any government institution must rest upon a full
understanding. of its function and operations by the public; . . . concealment, decep-
tion or ignorance weakens and eventually will destroy an institution." Letter From
Professor Thomas Emerson of the Yale Law School to Arthur S. Miller, May 12, 1966
(used by permission).An unexplored area of constitutional concern is the meaning for the first amend-
ment's freedoms of expression, as well as the meaning for democratic government gen-
erally, of a government which "manages" news, pursues secrecy policies, at times is
not candid, and otherwise pollutes the stream of information to the people. The
[Vol. 1967: 522
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loss" would occur if the truth were known about the judicial process.
To call it a loss is to fall into the Holmesian fallacy of looking at the
law solely through the eyes of the "bad man."' Law, if it means any-
thing, must mean more than the workings of the judicial process.' 9
One must visualize the social role of law in the myriad of day-to-day
transactions of people, rather than in those disputes which are sent
to lawyers or which end in judicial decision.20 Fourth, to our
knowledge no one has suggested that judges doff their robes. Candor
does not require that pomp and ceremony be eliminated or that the
awesome dignity of the Court be discarded. We cheerfully concede
that there is some value in the outward trappings of courts.21 Fifth,
again we know of no one who has ever suggested or implied that
judges should not strive for "impartiality." But is that effort to
achieve what Frankfurter called "an invincible disinterestedness" 22
to be attained by adherence to the declaratory theory? We think
not. Moreover, the connection which impartiality has with the
alleged need for adhering to the declaratory theory is not self-
evident.23 Sixth, the perpetuation of error at the expense of truth
is dangerous because the error may be forgotten as error and believed
"market place" theory of truth becomes at least shaky, if not repudiated. See, e.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503-05 (1952); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
18 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. I-. R ev. 457, 459 (1897).
10 see HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW passim (1961), for an exposition of the "good
man" theory.
20 See Miller, A Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court Opinions, 10 J. PuB. L. 139
(1961).
2-It is not at all clear why the Supreme Court enjoys prestige as a result of the
rituals or myths which surround it. The prestige may derive from the mystery ot
the Tribunal. Cf. Reston, The Mysterious Ways of Lyndon Johnson, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 21, 1964, p. 28, col. 3 (quoting President Charles de Gaulle): "There can be no
prestige without mystery .... In the designs, the demeanor, and the mental operations
of a leader, there must always be a 'something' which others cannot altogether fathom,
which puzzles them, stirs them, and rivets their attention."
The Court may also satisfy the psychological needs of persons. See FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 243-52 (1931).
22 Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW 6, 21 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
22 Frankfurter seemed to say as much in his well-known majority opinion in Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952): "We may not draw on our merely personal and
private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function."
Id. at 170. "To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objec-
tivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism,
incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views
not shared." Id. at 171. "[T]hese are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial
process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those en-
trusted with ultimate judicial power." Id. at 172.
Vol. 1967: 522]
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as truth; fictions have a way of becoming pernicious. Deliberate
obfuscation will ultimately destroy; planned obscurantism by an in-
tellectual elite cannot be justified. Finally, it may well be that the
truth, however much it is hidden, will out, sooner or later; and it is
better for the revelation to occur sooner so that conscious efforts to
deal with it'may be undertaken.
The declaratory theory rests upon at least two erroneous prem-
ises. The first and most obvious fallacy is the assumption that the
law is not a creation of men but rather exists as some form of
Platonic Idea.24 The second, and perhaps more crucial, error upon
which the theory is based is the assumption that the judicial process
operates at an ideal level. This premise, however, is simply not
true.25
In addition to resting upon two erroneous premises, the declara-
tory theory is also subject to attack upon another ground. There
exists today the very real and very perplexing problem of the pro-
liferation of precedents. 26 The geometric progression of reported
cases, estimated at over 100,000 pages of reported judgments or 70
million words per year issuing from state courts of last resort and
federal courts,-7 has the effect of making it possible to find case
support for almost any theory or argument. Stare decisis loses
meaning when alternate lines of authority exist in opposition to each
other; the force of a guiding criterion is no longer available.28 It is
only when one line of authority exists, which is seldom in fact true,
that stare decisis is operative because only then does it provide a
criterion for decision.2 What is really at stake is the nature of the
adversary system itself. But in a more limited fashion, the prolifera-
21 See Cooperrider, The Rule of Law and the Judicial Process, 59 MICH. L. REV.
501, 507 (1961).
25 See Breitel, Ethical Problems in the Performance of the Judicial Function, in
CONFEIENCE ON JuDicIAL ETHics 64, 67-68 (University of Chicago Conference Series
No. 19, 1965): "[The adversary system] . . . with the altogether proper commitment
of the lawyer to his client and his client's cause, all but absolute, is not exactly akin
to the asceptic techniques of the laboratory .... The popular notion that judges are
mere declarers of what is in the books, all laid down clearly and simply, is not
confined to the laity. It obtains too with large segments of the bar. And judges
still believe it."
2 See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1041 (1961).
2t STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAwYERS' REASONINGS 13 (1964).
28 This phenomenon has been called the "principle of doctrinal polarity." Miller,
A Note on the Criticism of Supreme Court Opinions, 10 J. PUB. L. 139, 144 (1961).
With several lines of authority the doctrine becomes multipolar.
21 It is the choice between conflicting doctrinal principles that makes any decision
creative. See Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 3, 4 (1966).
[Vol. 1967: 522
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tion of precedents weakens the declaratory theory by making the
doctrine of stare decisis, which is its backbone, impracticable.
With such serious defects, it might be wondered how the declara-
tory theory has attained acceptance, both within the profession and
with certain segments of the laity. Part of the reason is that it
neatly fits into the mainstream of western thought epitomized in
Newtonian mechanics and Cartesian philosophy. The declaratory
theory has an illusion of certainty, a mechanical appeal that is almost
mathematical. The classic treatment of legal reasoning bears out
this thesis. It is commonly believed that legal thinking is a
deductive-analogistic process in which prior cases are related by
analogy to the case at hand and conclusions deduced therefrom.3 0
But if this is true, what does the lawyer argue when the precedents
are clearly against him? How does he argue policy? How does he
present statistics to the court? Indeed, it is at this point that one
may rightfully ask: "How can courts, supposedly by logical deduc-
tion from non-contemporaneous legal propositions, and without
entering upon social and ethical inquiries, reach conclusions so well
adapted (on the whole) to contemporary problems?" 3' 1 Julius Stone
finds the answer by a thorough examination of what he calls "the
categories of illusory reference" which, in the process of legal reason-
ing, "serve as devices permitting a secret and even unconscious exer-
cise by courts of what in the ultimate analysis is a creative choice."32
By thus attacking the logical form of the traditional doctrine of
legal reasoning, Stone manages to show that there cannot be, in
effect, strict deductive reasoning in law. This circumstance forces
the judge to base his decision on other considerations, such as public
policy and statistical facts, though he may not want to do this.33 It
is this inherent problem in the judicial process that may in large
"0 Dean Levi categorizes legal reasoning as a three-step process "described by the
doctrine of precedent in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is made
into a rule of law and then applied to a next similar situation. The steps are these:
similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is an-
nounced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second case." LEv, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LTCAL REAsoNING 2 (1949). Reasoning, thus, is by example or
analogy. See geherally Schaefer, supra note 29.
31 STONE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 240.
82 Id. at 241.
3$As Holmes pointed out, "perhaps one of the reasons why judges do not like
to discuss questions of policy, or to put a decision in terms upon their views as law-
makers, is that the moment you leave the path of merely logical deduction you lose
the illusion of certainty which makes legal reasoning seem like mathematics." Holmes,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HAuv. L. REy. 1, 7 (1894).
Vol. 1967: 522]
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measure be responsible for the continued acceptance of the declara-
tory theory.
A better explanation of the nature of legal reasoning has been
offered by philosopher John Wisdom. Directing himself to the
case where there are no issues of fact in dispute, he observes that
in such cases we notice that the process of argument is not a
chain of demonstrative reasoning. It is a presenting and re-
presenting of those features of the case which severally co-operate
in favour of the conclusion, in favour of saying what the reasoner
wishes said, in favour of calling the situation by the name by
which he wishes to call it. The reasons are like the legs of a
chair, not the links of a chain. Consequently although the dis-
cussion is a priori and the steps are not a matter of experience,
the procedure resembles scientific argument in that the reasoning
is not vertically extensive but horizontally extensive-it is a matter
of the cumulative effect of several independent premises, not of
the repeated transformation of one or two.3 4
Wisdom's analysis is helpful to explain the weight of the many
factors involved in a decision, and his metaphor of the "legs of
a chair" provides a scheme for graphically demonstrating the force
of each competing interest in a legal problem or litigation. The
prevalent notion of the process of legal reasoning is only a half-
truth; it represents only one of the "legs of a chair." Thus, one leg
is reliance upon rules of law, another is the possible unsettling effect
of new rules of law, a third is the precedents, a fourth is the policy
arguments, and so forth. The point is that the nature of legal
reasoning, while giving the appearance of being mathematical and
syllogistic, is more intricate and less certain than is normally con-
ceived. In addition, it is sui generis. Reasoning in law, just as
reasoning in morals, suffers from a comparison to, or equation with,
either deductive or inductive logic.35 The myth of mechanistic
(declaratory) reasoning clouds a clearer picture of the actual process.
A discarding of this myth would prompt the bench and the bar
openly to concede and thus more effectively to realize that there
are other, and more important, matters to argue before a court than
the precedents; and at least there should be several matters argued
Wisdom, Gods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARiSTOTELIAN SOCIETY 185, 194 (1945), re-
printed in FrEw, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 194, 203 (1965).
35 See HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS (1952); TOULMIN, REASON IN ETHICS 67-85
(1950). See generally Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice: An Inquiry into the Logic of
Judicial Argument, 1961 (unpublished thesis in Harvard Law School Library).
[Vol. 1967: 522
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and not merely the precedents. Furthermore, the flow of informa-
tion to a court, as well as its institutional makeup, might be recog-
nized to be in need of re-examination and change.
The cogency of the declaratory theory also rests upon miscon-
struction of its antithesis. Why should judges be limited in their
function to merely "finding" a pre-existing law? What danger is
there in allowing a judge to "create" law?36 The declaratory theory
rests in part upon a reductio ad absurdum argument which runs
as follows: if we allow judges to do more than find the law, we shall
be inviting judicial caprice with the result that similar cases will
not be decided similarly; the symmetry of the law will be destroyed;
personal feelings of the judge rather than law will govern; reliance
upon law will become an impossibility. In other words, the only
alternative to the declaratory theory is no acceptable system at all,
so the theory must be correct, or at least the only one feasible. This
conclusion, however, is a non sequitur. The alternative to the
declaratory theory is not necessarily judicial caprice but rather a
restricted from of recognized judicial creativity. To assert that the
role of the judge is broader than merely finding the law is not to say
that the judge will be entirely free to follow his own predilections.
The fallacy involved here is the "all-or-nothing mistake" which
assumes "a naked dichotomy where no such simplification is war-
ranted." 7
Once it is recognized that the rejection of the declaratory theory
does not mean the adoption of judicial caprice, a weighty argument
for retention of the theory is dissipated. That theory, by postulating
a straw enemy, became the answer to what appeared to be a very
serious problem: if one did not accept the theory, judges would be
uncontrolled and uncontrollable. The only solution was to prevent
the subjective element from entering into the decisional process,
either in the form of personal bias or innovative ability. This
position, carried to its necessary conclusion, would require removing
judges and replacing them with logicians since the really important
36 Before the' rise of legislatures and codification, which came in the nineteenth
century, most law was created by judges. See Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. CHI.
L. REV. 237, 240-42 (1959). In recent years, the notion has spread that only legislatures
can "make" law, but the notion is false. Not only courts, but executives and ad-
ministrators, make law-and at an increasing rate. Even private organizations par-
ticipate directly in the law making process. Compare TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PRocEss (1951) with MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
S7 see FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, FALLACY-THE COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT 30 (1959).
Vol. 1967: 522]
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element is the deductive syllogism from the precedents to the instant
case.38 That there is a subjective element in judicial decision-
making, and a large one at that, can no longer be doubted.39 And
the unavoidable subjective element in law, coupled with a referential
element linking law with society in general, demands a more
sophisticated view of the judicial process than the declaratory theory
is capable of supplying.
It may be objected that although the alternative to the declara-
tory theory is not necessarily judicial caprice, nevertheless the door
to caprice is opened by removal of the only fetters upon the judges
that the legal system imposes. In other words, the declaratory theory
may not be completely accurate, but at least it offers a restraint upon
judges that is otherwise unavailable. Thus, according to a nine-
teenth century judge, "Nothing keeps a judge so strictly in the line
of his duty, as the feeling and constant realization of the fact, that he
is bound by precedents. He knows, that his opinion will be by the
legal profession with all its astuteness subjected to the severest
criticism, and if he dares to depart on a given question from the well
marked line of precedents, either his ability or integrity is in great
danger of being impugned." 40  The answer to this assertion is
that there are institutional restraints upon the office; the judge is
not to act from individual and personal motives but rather he should
decide the case according to "law" which may or may not be repre-
sented in precedents. It is not a "government of men" to decide
outside the doctrine of precedent if it is recognized that "law" means
more than precedent and if the case is decided disinterestedly. In
an age of legislative and even more of executive dominance, it seems
a bit odd to be concerned about "judicial tyranny." The real prob-
lem is how to make courts more effective.
Some may object that this discussion is moot since nobody be-
lieves in a strict version of the declaratory theory.41 While few per-
38 See Breitel, supra note 23, at 69: "The key numbers in the digests will give you
the cases, the black letter in the hombooks and the Restatements will give you the
principles, let the lawyers do the work, and just carry along placidly until the day
comes when the computers will make it even easier."
"9 See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication,
27 U. CHm. L. REv. 661, 671-83 (1960); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict
of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468, 477 (1928).
,0 Clarke & Co. v. Figgins, 27 W. Va. 663, 672 (1886).
'"But see STONE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 235. The history of the strict English
deference to stare decisis is traced in HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PRocEsS: BASIC PROD-
[Vol. 1967: 522
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sons accept the theory in full force, such an objection misconceives
the effect of overt removal of the theory, the advantages of which are
varied. In the first place, removal would give a clearer picture of
how the system operates and thereby make it easier to identify its
deficiencies. In addition, arguing a case before a judge would be
more purposeful, for the judge and the lawyers would be forced to
see "all" of the legs of the chair, not just some of them. In each case
the movement of law could be seen as only a part of the larger move-
ment of society. Moreover, the strained contortions through which
some courts now go to fit a decision into a well-developed line of
authorities could be avoided.42 More importantly, however, the
removal of the vestiges of the declaratory theory would provide
a foundation for a different view of the role of the judicial process.
Although these advantages are somewhat less significant with regard
to the Supreme Court, which has tended to be a policy maker on a
grander scale than other courts, nevertheless, it is important to see
that the judicial process, vis-4-vis the other governmental processes
of law making, is basically creative.
However, Professor Mishkin has suggested that public disaffection
LEIS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAv 592-95 (Tent. ed. 1958). Recently,
however, the House of Lords announced that it will no longer consider- itself strictly
bound by precedents. See [1966] 1 Weekly L.R. 1234: "Their Lordships regard the use
of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and
its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon
which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly
development of legal rules.
"Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent may
lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development
of the law. They propose, therefore to modify their present practice and, while
treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous
decision when it appears right to do so.
"In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively
the basis on which contracts settlements of property, and fiscal arrangements have
been entered into and also the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law."
See Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid Stare Decisis
Falls, 80 HARv. L. REv. 797 (1967). See also Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality,
and Society, 36 COLUM. L. Rav. 699, 737 (1936): "Still, in the main, secret judicial
innovation lends itself lightly to rape which may be unintentional. It is better policy,
though worse manners, for judges to say so, when they change the law. Change it,
to my mind, and by my reading of the books, they not only do, and must, but
should.... Still they should see and say what they are doing."
"2 We believe, with Professor Corbin, that "a better brand of justice may be
delivered by a court that is clearly conscious of its own processes, than by one that
states hard-bitten traditional rules and doctrines and then attains an instinctively felt
justice by an avoidance of them that is only half-conscious, accompanied by an ex-
tended exegisis worthy of a medieval theologian." 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 561, at 279
(rev. ed. 1960).
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would accompany public realization that the United States Supreme
Court makes policy.43 As Professor R. G. McCloskey has pointed
out, and as our modest survey buttresses, the prestige of the Court
appears to rest upon factors unrelated to the declaratory theory.44
The mystique of the Court and the extent to which people agree
with the conclusions of Court decisions seem to be far more im-
portant to the Court's prestige.45 In fact, abandonment of the
declaratory theory would enable the Court to articulate more closely
the reasons for its decisions and thus provide clearer guides for the
people to follow.46 Perry Miller has pointed out that at the turn
of the nineteenth century there was great antagonism towards the
law because it was too sophisticated for the common man who was
unable to use it as a guide for his conduct.47 With the increased
press coverage of the Supreme Court and even lesser tribunals, the
public is becoming increasingly aware of the nature and functioning
of the judicial process. Furthermore, public interest has increased
as the type of cases with which the Court deals vitally affect every
person. The apportionment cases, the vast area of civil rights and
civil liberties, voting rights, and even obscenity, are pervasive
enough to draw into their net the concern of the entire community.
Using Alexander Pekelis's phrase, the Court has indeed become
immersed in the "travail of society,"48 which means that much more
will be demanded of law because the public appears to be expecting
much more.
43 Mishkin, supra note 13, at 67-70.
44 McCloskey, Principles, Powers and Values: The Establishment Clause and the
Supreme Court, in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 29 n.60 (Giannella ed. 1965):
"The trouble is that, although we are accustomed to talk loosely about the 'prestige'
of the Court, we know very little about its nature or about what causes it to ebb
and flow. I would suggest that when we use the term, we usually have two somewhat
different things in mind: The pro-judicial opinion that derives from approval of the
Court's specific recent policy trends, and the pro-judicial opinion that rests on a
belief in the value of the judicial institution, quite apart from the question of how
that institution is currently behaving. Obviously the first variety is less constant
and dependable than the second, and it would be useful (though perhaps impossible)
for purposes of prediction to know what proportion of the Court's 'prestige' at any
given time is to be attributed to each."
" See Miller, Some Pervasive Myths About the United States Supreme Court, 10
ST. Louis U.L.J. 153, 154-56 (1965).
,6 "In a good society bad laws are never happily tolerated, but uncertain law is
intolerable." Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1966, p. 14, col. 1.4T MIrat, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 102-04 (1965).
8 PEKELts, The Case for a Jurisprudence of Welfare, in LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION I,
40 (Konvitz ed. 1950).
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The core of the problem created by the declaratory theory
is reconciling legal change with the notion of certainty. Simply
because society is in a period of extremely rapid change, the law
cannot stand still; law by and large must reflect the society in which it
exists and which it seeks to govern.49 With change both constant and
cataclysmic, there should be little wonder that law moves both legis-
latively and judicially. The Constitution must, of course, be up-
dated; the responsibility for this function rests largely, although not
entirely, with the United States Supreme Court. 0 In its decisions,
the Court necessarily must be forward-looking, purposive, teleo-
logical, immersed in the travail of society. Otherwise it could
scarcely serve its constitutional purpose. This does not sit well
with those who yearn for an elegantia juris, for a Court that operates
in accordance with their own preconcevied notions of propriety.51
In the final analysis, what is wanted from the Supreme Court are
"' As Professor M. S. McDougal points out, we are not concerned with a "mere body
of rules but with a whole process of decision, and a process of decision making taking
place within the context of, and as a response to, a larger community process." Mc-
Dougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1
NATURAL L.F. 53, 56 (1956).
50 The Constitution may be "changed" by any of our instruments of governance.
For example, the internal alterations made by the executive and legislative branches
work a change in the constitutional order. Similarly, the failure of state governments
to assume their responsibilities has contributed heavily to the decline of federalism.
In addition, the Constitution can be altered by amendment. Furthermore, long
continued usage, as in the rise of political parties, may be said to effect constitutional
change.
31 Those who would restrict the courts to performing exclusively logicians' exercises
fail to realize that political theories explain the function of government rather than
dictate it. Some statements of Nobel Prize winner in physics, Percy W. Bridgman,
seem apposite: "I will not attach as much importance as do apparently a good many
professional lawyers to getting all law formulated into a verbally consistent edifice.
No one who has been through the experience of modem physics . . . can believe
that there can be such an edifice, but it seems to me that nevertheless I can some-
times detect an almost metaphysical belief in the minds of some people in the possi-
bility of such an edifice. If one needs specific details to fortify his conviction that
there is no such edifice, plenty can be found .... The situation . . . for the lawyer
resembles somewhat the general situation for the scientist. We have seen that in the
popular view the scientist assumes that nature operates according to certain broad
sweeping generalities. This is paraphrased by saying that the scientist must have
'faith' that there are natural laws. We have not accepted this view. It seems to me
that a better description of how the scientist operates is to say that he adopts the
program of finding as much regularity as he can in the operation of nature, without
any prior commitment as to how much he will find. So too it seems to me that here
the lawyer should and can make no prior commitment about the possibility of
erecting a self-contained self-consistent verbal legal edifice, but al that he can strive
for is as self-contained and logically consistent an edifice as he can erect." BEDGMAN,
Tn WAY THINGs ARE 308-09 (1959). (Emphasis in original.)
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wise decisions, wise in the sense of furthering the values of a demo-
cratic polity. If with such decisions there may also be obtained
opinions which fit within the concept of idealized versions of the
judiciary, so much the better. But the Court has never operated
in that manner; it has always been content to make its decisions and
to "explain" them in opinions most of which any first-year law stu-
dent can pull apart with ease. The Justices have always been "result
oriented" and politically minded. They have been cognizant of the
political consequences of their decisions. In their appraisal of these
consequences, they have sometimes erred, as in Dred Scott, 2 Pol-
lack, 5 and Butler. 4 More often, they have overruled themselves. 5
Often, perhaps routinely, they have innovated, 0 in the sense that any
ruling on the merits has an element of creativity. In any event, the
Court in recent years has had to attempt to adapt itself to changing
reality, and it is that effort that is the subject of our concern.
A SECOND PRoPosmION
It seems evident that an effort is being made by the Court,
silently and with indifferent success thus far, to develop new insti-
tutional means of dealing with the questions of public policy which
are presented to it. These questions may involve statutory interpre-
tation or constitutional construction. As Tocqueville and others
have observed, all questions of public policy do not reach the Court;
nevertheless, they appear there with sufficient frequency to make the
Court an important organ of American governance. A second propo-
sition, then, may be stated thusly: The adversary system, as it has
developed, is not entirely suitable to the resolution of the important
problems of public polciy which the Court is forced to decide.
It seems accurate to assert that the Justices have already recognized the
82 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating Missouri
Compromise of 1820).53 Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (invalidating federal
income tax).
54 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural Adjustment
Act of 1933).
1 See generally Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in The Supreme Court,
57 MicH. L. Rv. 151 (1958); Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of
Lawmaking of the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. Ptm. L. 414 (1959).
.
50The "prospective" overruling cases appear to represent an innovation which
rests heavily upon political and practical "consequence orientation." This device has
allowed the Court to change the law without throwing open all the jails of the
country. See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-35 (1966).
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validity of this proposition. The recognition that "policy" plays as
great a part as doctrine in the decisional process, the growing
tendency to use "non-legal" materials to buttress decisions, the wide-
spread employment of the most open'and liberal type of judicial
notice-all these, and more, tend to show that the principal func-
tion of the adversary system is to present a controversy to the Court.
The litigants are important because only they can activate the
judicial process.
Unlike legislators or executives, the Court must await the com-
mencement of a lawsuit, which of course limits its power to enunci-
ate policy. That power is also limited by the self-restraint of some
Justices, who demand that suits be brought by "proper" plaintiffs
in cases involving issues considered amenable to judicial treatment.
But self-restraint is, as Mr. Justice Stone once remarked, the only
restraint upon the Court once a case has been accepted for decision
on the merits. 57 In this respect it differs in some degree from the
avowedly political branches of government, the officials of which are
the butt of the pressures of politics. 58 Of course it is true, or at least
seems to be true, that while the Justices are not prey to the day-to-day
pulls and tugs of the political process, they nevertheless have their
radar rather keenly attuned to what might be called "the. art of the
possible." Sometimes they have misread the social signals, but
usually they have been in tune with the philosophy of the times in
which they operated. The point, however, is that the chief func-
tion of the adversary system is to trigger a judicial response. Some-
times it is difficult for interest groups desirous of a Supreme Court
decision to find "proper" plaintiffs; the Negro movement was to
some extent characterized by this difficulty, particularly in the early
1950s. However, Americans are a litigious people, and the Court
has not lacked business in recent years.
Once the machinery of the adversary system has been invoked,
a number of significant shortcomings become evident. In the first
place, the growing attention paid to what are given the generic
label of "policy considerations" in judicial decision-making clearly
'I United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (dissenting opinion). See MASON,
HARLAN FISKE STONE: PxLLAR oF Tm LAw 405-18 (1956).
18 Even in the allegedly independent regulatory commissions, policies tend to be the
resultant of a parallelogram of conflicting political forces. See BERNSTEIN, REGU-
LATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). See also FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1962); HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 59-119 (1952).
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evidences a breakaway from the traditional adversary system5 0
What are "policy considerations?" Often employed but seldom de-
fined, the term is one of the most loosely used in legal terminology.
When it is defined it is in terms of higher level abstractions, which
become meaningless in application.60
However, when policies are identified, and when they stand in
opposition to doctrinal commands, a judge must act as legislator, 1
since weighing considerations of social advantage is what legislatures
do, subject to judicial vetoes when constitutional limitations are
transgressed. But it is also what courts inevitably do. Policy con-
siderations are part of the legal order, not outside of it and not alien
to it. The problem is whether the adversary system of constitutional
adjudication is adequate to provide relrvant data and criteria for the
satisfactory resolution of policy questions. The answer that we sug-
gest is "no." We further suggest that considerable evidence is avail-
able now to indicate a departure from the system as it was known
historically and that further institutional changes must be developed
if the Court is to remain vital. These latter suggestions derive from
an evaluation of both the adequacy of the flow of information to the
Court and the competence of the Justices to rule on complex prob-
lems of public policy.
The notion that the Supreme Court depends upon the ad-
versaries to furnish it with the data relevant and necessary to
decision is an obvious fiction. As Judge Wyzanski has stated:
This tendency of a court to inform itself has increased in recent
years following the lead of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Not merely in constitutional controversies and in statutory
interpretation but also in formulation of judge-made rules of
39The function of the adversary system is to disclose for resolution factual
disputes within the framework of the declaratory theory of law.
e0That judges should more forthrightly face the policy considerations behind
a rule of law has long been advocated. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HAv. L. Rav. 457; 467 (1897); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HAiv.
L. R-v. 1222, 1252-53 (1931). However, definitions (or even descriptions) of "policy"
considerations are rare. Professors Lasswell and McDougal have offered the follow-
ing: "Policy norms. These are propositions about how values ought to be distributed,
including those to which we have given special mention, like power, respect, knowledge,
safety and health, comfort and convenience." Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Edu-
cation and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J.
263, 241 (1943). (Emphasis in original.)
6"The Supreme Court also acts as a legislature when it refuses to act. See
Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-An
Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. Rav. 293 (1950).
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law, the justices have resorted, in footnotes and elsewhere, to
references drawn from legislative hearings, studies by executive
departments, and scholarly monographs.62
The object is to inform the judicial mind, and that is done by ad-
versaries in briefs and oral argument and by the Justices who take
cognizance of material deemed relevant and helpful to them.6" The
policy function which the Court must perform "can only be success-
fully carried out if the Court consciously strives to inform itself as
fully as possible of the factual setting of each case and the social
consequences likely to flow from each decision."'6 4 In addition,
part of an adequate informing process must be directed at assisting
the Justices to select the "correct" criteria for evaluating and, at
times, choosing from among several relevant policies.65
The problem has troubled some of the Justices, who have not
found the orthodox means of informing the judicial mind adequate.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once remarked: "Can we not take judicial
notice of writing by people who competently deal with these prob-
62 ,Vyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1281,
1295 (1952). The author continued: "Such resort is sometimes defended as an extension
of Mr. Brandeis' technique as counsel for the state in Muller v. Oregon. In Muller's
case, however, Mr. Brandeis' object was to demonstrate that there was a body of
informed public opinion which supported the reasonableness of the legislative rule of
law. But in the cases of which I am speaking these extra-judicial studies are drawn
upon to determine what would be a reasonable judicial rule of law. Thus the
focus of the inquiry becomes not what judgment is permissible, but what judgment is
sound. And here it seems to me that the judge, before deriving any conclusions from
any extra-judicial document or information, should lay it before the parties for their
criticism." Id. at 1295-96. (Emphasis in original.)
63 The signals or inputs a judge receives are usually conflicting; in addition, they
are normatively ambiguous. In other words, there is difficulty enough with the "is" but
when it comes to the "ought," then any decision-maker, including a judge, is beset
with a welter of inconsistent demands. Cf. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 60, at
239-43. See also SH1..AR, LEGALISM passim (1964).
"I Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 637, 639 (1966).
"See COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 192-93 (1946): "If, however, there are any
principles of political science which enlightened experience makes dear, they are
(1) that the worst form of government is that which separates power from responsi-
bility, and (2) that the weakest government is that which has relatively little access
to the sources of information. And does not the fiction that the courts only follow
the words of the Constitution in fact relieve them of the responsibility . . . and is it
not also true that this fiction that the courts decide only questions of law prevents
us from organizing the courts so that they could have the opportunity of making
adequate investigation into the actual facts on which they have to pass? Do we
want our judges to be not only irresponsible to any earthly power, but also independent
of adequate knowledge of the social consequences of their decisions?"
For a recent exposition of the use of socio-legal data in adjudication, see Green,
Sociology in Court, Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1967, p. 1, col. 1.
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lems? Can I not take judicial notice of Myrdal's book without
having him called as a witness? .. . It is better to have witnesses, but
I did not know that we could not read the works of competent
writers."06  In this same connection, Mr. Justice Brennan has
observed that "the briefs of counsel are always helpful, but each of
us is better satisfied when he not only checks but also supplements
those materials with independent research."'67 A serious difficulty
with this procedure of self-information which goes to the heart of
the judicial system is that the adversaries will have no opportunity
to know or to meet such information with opposing or contradictory
data. A further trouble is that no guidelines exist by which the
Justices are to act; each is free to do as little or as much "in-
dependent research" as his time (and that of his assistants) will
permit. On the other hand, he is not required to do any at all, and
can wholly rely upon what counsel brings to him. He is free to be
as lazy or energetic as he wishes.
Moreover, to the extent that "independent research" is con-
ducted, there is a breakaway from the orthodox view of the function
of the adversary system. The judge himself becomes an active and
avowed element in the informing process. Of course he can do
this without violating the expectations of the adversary system by
relying upon a liberalized and expanded concept of judicial notice.
Information can and does flow to the Supreme Court dehors the
"normal" paths. Moreover, the same occurrence may be observed
throughout the adjudicatory process, whether it is judicial or admin-
istrative.68
CFrankfurter, J., quoted from oral argument in MURPHY & PRrrcHErT, CouRTs,
JUDGES, AND POLITICS 318 (1961).
67 Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 299,
303 (Westin ed. 1963).
68 See Wormuth, The Impact of Economic Legislation upon the Supreme Court,
6 J. PUB. L. 296, 307-08 (1957). See generally 2 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATiVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 15.01-.14 (1958, Supp. 1965). Put another way, the Supreme Court at times takes
"legislative facts" into consideration. See Alfange, supra note 61, at 667-79; Karst,
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. Cr. REV. 75.
The expanded use of amicus curiae briefs appears to be an outgrowth of the Court's
desire to learn more about the law which they are called upon to make. See
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694,
717 (1963). Primary evidence of the use of extra-record facts in constitutional adjudi-
cation can be found in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1952). See also Cascade
Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas. Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting): "[T]he Court lays down 'guidelines' with respect to complex issues which
will shape the future of an important segment of this Nation's commerce. In so
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"The adversary principle," Professor Philip Selznick has observed,
". lends legitimacy to partisan advocacy within the legal process,
allowing and even encouraging the zealous pursuit of special interest
by means of self-serving interpretations of law and evidence."69 In
constitutional adjudication, however, it is apparent that these self-
serving interpretations do not-cannot-carry the weighty task of
bringing all of the data and arguments to the attention of the
Court. Even the use of amici curiae briefs and of "Brandeis briefs"
fall short of the need. Independent research, conducted by "judge
and company," apparently is considered necessary. The adversary
system is simply not adequate to the need; the parochial and spe-
cialized interests of individual litigants, whether natural or corporate
persons or unincorporated associations, cannot fully produce all the
information which the Justice needs in coming to a decision and in
writing his opinion. As Selznick says, the assumptions behind the
adversary principle "have not been fully analyzed or tested," and
"there is evidence that partisan advocacy is weakened under condi-
tions that may become increasingly prevalent: [including] the com-
mitment of a tribunal to a positive outcome ... [and] reliance on
experts and investigators who serve the court directly .. ".."70 As
the Supreme Court in its constitutional decisions becomes more and
more purposive or instrumental-that is, pays greater attention to the
policy considerations-the need for analysis and testing of the ad-
versary system has become obvious. The Court is drawing away
from it, but has not yet produced a viable alternative means of
decision-making. The Court is still a court, hampered by all of the
shortcomings of litigation as a means of developing public policy.
Litigation-the adversary system-is not adequate, for other
reasons as well. In addition to the invalidity of the underlying
assumption that the flow of information to the Court is sufficient to
doing the Court roams at large, unconfined by anything so mundane as a factual record
developed in adversary proceedings."
00 SELZNICK, SocIOLOGY OF LAW 16 (1965) (mimeographed; to be published in the
forthcoming International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences) (quoted by permission).
Of importance, but of peripheral interest to the inquiry here, is the inadequacy of
the adversary system-of judicial review itself-when so-called "low-visibility" admin-
istrative decisions are challenged. These small claims are not worth litigating, even
though they may be of importance to the individual; accordingly, some other institu-
tion, such as the "ombudsman," may well be in order. On this point, see GELLHORN,
WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN (1966).
70 Ibid.
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the need, there is another (also unwarranted) assumption of equal or
greater importance: that the Justices have the competence or ex-
pertise requisite to make many of the pronouncements on public
policy that they issue. A final unfounded assumption is that the
Justices have some means-of forecasting and evaluating the social
consequences of their decisions-which, again, is simply not true.
These latter two inadequacies of the adversary system may be
treated together.
Supreme Court Justices must rise above the narrow knowledge
and analysis. presented by the litigants and view the scheme or prob-
lem entire. The late Judge Charles Clark said in 1956 that "experi-
ence has taught me that only rarely and perhaps fortuitously may
an opinion be expected to rise above its sources in the presentations
of counsel." 71 One would have to examine all of the data formally
presented to the Supreme Court in individual cases to determine
whether Judge Clark's assertion is valid for the High Bench. The
arguments and information presented often do require the in-
dependent research we have mentioned, although that research may
be confined (in most, if not all, cases) to the arguments and issues
presented by counsel. Professor Lon Fuller has observed that the
moral force of a judgment is at a maximum if a judge decides solely
on the basis of arguments presented to him. "Because if he goes
beyond these he will lack the guidance given him by the parties and
may not understand the interests that are affected by a decision
rendered outside that framework." 72 But that is often what he must
do, for as Woodrow Wilson said, Americans look for "statesmanship"
in their judges.3
Fuller's statement is helpful so far as it goes, but it fails to take
into consideration the growing evidence of the lack of judicial com-
petence or expertise, which is sometimes expressly recognized by
members of the Court and sometimes an obvious conclusion from
the manner in which opinions are written.74 Judges, for example,
71 Harmar Drive-in Theater, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d 555, 559
(2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., dissenting).72 FuLLEP, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 707 (1949).
" WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 168 (1908).
" See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 578, 580-82
(1940), and 311 U.S. 570, 575-77 (1941). In administrative law, the point is exemplified
in the cases involving the "scope of review" of administrative decisions. See 4 DAVIS,
op. cit. supra note 68, §§ 29-.01-.11.
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do not receive the type of economic analysis requisite to better
decisions. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in an off-bench statement, made
the point in these words:
Take a problem that has been confronting the Supreme Court,
Sherman Law regulation of the movie industry. A number of de-
cisions have been rendered finding violations under the Sherman
Law. Does anybody know, when we have a case, as we had one the
other day, where we can go to find light on what the practical
consequences of these decisions have been? ... I don't know to
what extent these things can be ascertained. I do know that, to
the extent that they may be relevant in deciding cases, they ought
not to be left to the blind guessing of myself and others only a
little less informed than I am.75
This passage tells us several things: (a) the bench, at least in antitrust
cases, has no particular expertise and must be educated; (b) the bar
has not been helpful in this educational process; (c) judges are con-
cerned with the consequences of decision as well as doctrine; and
(d) the adversary system may be at fault in that it does not provide
a court with the proper institutional means of informing itself.
Judges have no way of becoming expert on many matters and must
make, as Frankfurter suggests, "blind" guesses. Neither can they
forecast the societal impact of their decisions, for the system does not
provide a way of feeding back that data to them-assuming that it is
available, which assuredly it is not. Furthermore, judges are not
"renaissance men"; they cannot be expected to be expert in all of
the complex problems presented to them.
Paying attention to policy considerations-adhering to a "juris-
prudence of consequences"-makes adjudication enormously more
complicated. For a judge to weigh considerations of social ad-
vantage is far more difficult than to apply rules or announce prin-
75 FRANKFURTER, SOME OBSERVAIONS ON SUPREME COURT LITIGATION AND LEGAL EDU-
CATION 17 (1954). See General Bronze Corp. v. Ward Prods. Corp., 262 F. Supp. 936,
937 (N.D.N.Y. 1966) (Foley, J.): "Justice Frankfurter wrote in Marconi Wireless Tele-
graph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60, . . . that it is an old ob-
servation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits them to discharge the
duties cast upon them by patent legislation. Although not a complete novice in patent
legislation, the prolonged deliberation I found necessary in this instance-interfered
with often by the pressures of the routine court work, the nature of much of this
in this federal district being undeferable-brought home the truth of this old observa-
tion and the senselessness by federal judges untrained in the patent art to pretend
otherwise." (Parallel citations omitted.)
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ciples in given cases. It calls for a quality of expertise in the legal
profession that is rare indeed and for which legal education does
little to prepare them. Cardozo noted this many years ago: "Some
of the errors of courts have their origin in imperfect knowledge of
the econoriic and social consequences of a decision, or of the eco-
nomic and social needs to which a decision will respond. In the
complexities of modem life there is a constantly increasing need for
resort by the judges to some fact-finding agency which will substitute
exact knowledge of factual conditions for conjecture and im-
pression."7 6 The need still exists-and has become more pressing as
society has become more complex.
This fact, if none other, should be sufficient to forego adherence
to the declaratory theory of law despite any possible symbolic value
it may possess. To insist that judges act like judges in the Blackstone
manner, in other words, is to deprive them of the very means which
would make them more efficient and expert. The adversary system
is not likely to be improved unless and until there is a general recog-
nition of its shortcomings and of the needs of rational policy-making
by an appointed bench. The adversary procedure embodies a con-
flict theory and assumes that when two parties are at odds on consti-
tutional issues and cannot settle their differences, by some magic
(the legal counterpart of the classical economist's "invisible hand")
the Court's resolution will inure to the general good. This will
be true, however, only if the Justices have the requisite competence,
both to dispose of the substantive matter at issue and to predict the
consequences of alternative decisions. Robert H. Jackson, when
Attorney General, recorded the astonishment of Europeans that
American monetary policy could be decided in a private law suit in-
volving $15.60.77 National public policies cannot (and will not) con-
tinue to be made judicially, we suggest, unless some better means of
making decisions is created. Of course, it is true that the Court has
recognized its limitations in a number of matters (including mone-
tary policy) with the possible result that a further diminution of
76 CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 116-17 (1924).
77JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 103 (1941). For a statement
that non-adversary procedure is more appropriate in some cases than adversary pro-
cedure, see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237-38, 246 & n.20, cert. denied, 375 U.S.
957 (1963) (parole board procedures). See also Kaplan, Civil Procedure-Reflections on
the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 409 (1960) (comparing German system
with American adversary system).
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power in the Supreme Court may take place. In any event, the
conclusion seems valid: the adversary system is inadequate.
A THIRD PROPOSITION
The final proposition may be stated as follows: If the Supreme
Court is to remain a significant and meaningful instrument of
governance, then it must react and direct itself to an ever-changing
reality. What is needed is that the Supreme Court find itself a new
role, as well as new institutional characteristics. When in the late
1930s and 1940s it abdicated its position as an authoritative faculty
of political economy and ceded to the political branches of govern-
ment ultimate control over politico-economic decisions, the need was
evident-and pressing-for the creation of a new role. This was
found in the drive for equality-the Negro rights cases, the urban
voter cases, the criminal law cases-by Justices deeply concerning
themselves with the workings of society and tackling some abrasive
problems they (as also the other organs of government) had thereto-
fore avoided.78 The spin-off from this activity has been great-in
legislation, in executive programs, in state laws. But the very suc-
cess of the Warren Court-and, outwardly at least, it has been highly
successful, perhaps the most successful Court in history-raises two
crucial questions: (1) Has the Court about worked itself out of
critical social problems with which to deal?79 and (2) Why has the
Court had this success?
78 In the drive for racial equality, franchise equality and fair treatment of criminal
suspects, for political and other reasons, the Court became the only governmental organ
that could institute constitutional change. What it did there, as well as elsewhere,
was to open the way to change, which has come with breathtaking speed in reappor-
tionment matters but which has been slow indeed with respect to the position of the
Negro. In this latter regard a report of the Civil Rights Commission issued in
February, 1967, indicated that racial isolation in education is increasing, both in the
South and North, despite the Brown decision. See Washington Post, Feb. 20, 1967,
p. A-1, col. 8, and p. A-5, col. 1.
70 We are aware that merely posing such a question will astonish many students of
the Court. What is said subsequently in the text is in terms of long-range tendencies
rather than what may (or may not) occur in the near future. In brief, our position
is predicated on the belief that the activism of the Warren Court is a short-term
phenomenon. In this connection, compare Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966),
with Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966). What is being suggested may be
characterized as neither a tactical retreat nor a full-scale strategic withdrawal by the
Court; rather, it is that the center of governmental gravity is slipping ineluctably
toward the political branches of government and that the Court at some time will
find itself with little of a fundamental nature on its docket.
See Graham, Supreme Court Preview: A Quieter Year Ahead, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2,
1966, p. E-8, col. 1: "The Supreme Court convenes tomorrow for the ceremonial
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So far as basic law is concerned, the voting situation is about
settled, the Negro now has equality in law if not in fact, and there
is little that can be done by way of developing new principles in
the criminal law area. In each of these doctrinal fields, to be sure,
cases will continue to be brought to the Court for settlement; but
in large part they will result in resolution and refinement of the
details of already established principle.80 For example, the Court
may venture into the areas of juvenile courts"' and military law.
But that development, if it comes, would merely extend its recent
criminal law holdings. What may be foreseen, then, is a diminishing
role for the Court-unless and until new areas are tackled. Further-
more, it is difficult indeed to discern what these areas might be.
Our suggestion is that the Court will soon have to start a search for
a new role, or find itself increasingly concerned with the minutiae
of public policy.
It is here that the second question obtrudes: Why has the Court
been successful in recent years? This success is taken for granted,
applauded or disapproved in accordance with the observer's personal
values, with little or no effort made to learn the bases for it. It
is suggested, inter alia, that the Court has succeeded because it has,
opening of its 1966 term, amid indications that the pendulum is swinging back from
the high point of its liberalizing impact on American life.
"The shift results not from changes of mind or personnel on the Court, but rather
through the steady shrinking of the number of the nation's ills that take the form of
unjust laws .... [A] review of the Court's upcoming work suggests that fewer of the
nation's major problems are coming its way."
80 The success of the Warren Court in promulgating national norms in the areas
of civil rights and civil liberties should not be taken to mean that these norms have
been or will be translated into operational reality. The contrary may well be the
case. Cf. Miller, Mulkey v. Reitman: A Brave But Futile Gesture?, 14 U.C.LA.L. REv.
51 (1966); Miller, On the Need for "Impact Analysis" of Supreme Court Decisions, 53
GEo. L.J. 365, 389-92 (1965); Wells & Grossman, The Concept of Judicial Policy-
Making: A Critique, 15 J. PuB. L. 286 (1966). The power of the Court to change the
behavior patterns of Americans is at best unknown and highly discontinuous. Despite
all the Court has done in recent years in rendering decisions having the projected effect
of enhancing the dignity of disadvantaged Americans, its history as a protector of the
unlettered and weak and of dissenting minorities has been anything but favorable.
Furthermore, with a change in Court personnel, which will come soon, it is possible
that the thrust and tenor of recent decisions will be reversed. In addition to Mr.
Justice Tom C. Clark, who has already announced his retirement to take place in
1967, there may be two or three other vacancies within the next year or two. A
shift in position is even possible in some areas without a change in personnel, as the
Court reads the social tea leaves and perceives the white reaction to what some consider
to be excesses in the Negro movement and the growing involvement in a war in Asia.
"1 See Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context for Juvenile Cases,
1966 Sup. CT. RV. 167.
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as Alexander Pekelis suggested twenty years ago, immersed itself in
the travail of society.82 Since 1940 it has made itself meaningful
to the drives and urges of significant segments of the American people
and has been able to translate into constitutional command some of
the ideals of the Constitution which have long lain dormant.
The Justices have recognized that it makes little sense in a unified,
if not entirely uniform, nation for the principle of Barron v. Balti-
more83 still to apply. Furthermore, and probably of vastly greater
importance, they did not hesitate to grasp the nettle of racial segre-
gation at the very time that the Congress was moribund, the Execu-
tive reluctant, and the Negro people on the march; and they recog-
nized that "one malarious peasant" should not be permitted to wield
electoral power equal to that of twelve residents of a city. In so
doing, they have made themselves part of a government of affirma-
tive orientation, part, that is, of the Positive State.84  They have
been creating a teleological jurisprudence in harmony with the
politico-economic decisions of Congress and the Executive.
In making these advances, the Court does not appear to have
markedly or obviously diminished in public esteem. Efforts to
reverse the Court's reforms have aborted. In addition, Senator
Sam Ervin of North Carolina is, at this writing, striving to have a bill
enacted which would enlarge the Court's powers.8 5 By its decisions
the Court has remained meaningful to the American people and its
continued acceptance will not depend upon its adherence to the
declaratory theory or whether its decisions are "reasoned" or
"principled"-unless the terms "reason" and "principle" are taken
to mean, not logical derivations from pre-existing doctrine, but "a
process of disciplined observation, coupled with a recognition that
82 See note 45 supra and accompanying text. See Miller, Notes on the Concept
of the "Living" Constitution, 31 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 881, 911 (1963).
83 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (announcing that the Bill of Rights applies only
to the federal government).
81 The concept of the Positive State is developed in previous articles by the senior
author. See Miller, The Public Interest Undefined, 10 J. PuB. L. 184 (1961); Miller, An
Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law?, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 399 (1962); Miller,
Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the Positive State, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 172 (1966).
8S . 2097, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pts. 1, 2 (1966). The bill would confer standing to challenge expenditures to sectarian
institutions under certain federal aid-to-education statutes.
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choices must be made among alternatives and a cognizance of the
consequences of the decisions. . .. "1,s
At present, three areas seem possibly ripe for greater judicial
development, with the result that the Supreme Court might main-
tain its position of power and respect. While other areas might be
suggested, Court activity to provide greater review of public admin-
istration, clearer recognition of the group basis of society, and adapta-
tion of a domestically oriented Constitution to an interdependent
world would be especially propitious. The passport cases, the crim-
inal law cases, and some recent administrative law decisions all point
to a greater interest in the individual qua individual in his dealings
with the public administration. So, too, with the group basis of
society, although the Court has been reluctant overtly to recognize
it. However, a number of cases at least give a hint of the develop-
ment toward a constitutional theory of group action.8 7 Further-
more, there is the decision in Marsh v. Alabama88 existing in the
United States Reports as a time bomb ticking away, available for use
whenever the Court would desire to recognize the governmental
character of the huge corporate combines.8 9 While there is some
indication that the Court will consider the third area of possible
activity, the reluctance to rule in the area of foreign affairs may
minimize such a venture.90 The extent to which the Supreme Court
can successfully assimilate such constitutional tasks cannot, of course,
be forecast with precision. At a time when the docket each year is
crowded and when students of the Supreme Court are calling upon
the Justices to make fewer decisions, it may seem odd to suggest that
se Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U.
CH. L. REv. 661, 694 (1960). Another view may be found in BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959).
8 See HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION 152-180 (1956); MILLER, PmivATE
GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1959).
-3 826 U.S. 501, 507 (1946). See Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate
Activity, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 93, 949-51 (1952).
89 See PEKELiS, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in LAW AND
SOCIAL ACTION 91 (Konvitz ed. 1950).
90 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Moore, Federalism
and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J. 248. Subsequent to the decision, Congress en-
acted a statute which will require a Court decision on the merits of the case. Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1013, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964). The statute, up-
held in the district court, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), 6 VA. J. INT'L L. 173 (1965), has not yet reached the Supreme Court. See also
F. Palacio y Compania v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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the time is fast approaching when a new constitutional role for the
High Bench must be carved out. But precisely that is suggested.
Whether the three areas of possible concern will in fact be tackled
is not at all certain. Without the institutional means necessary to
make "rational" decisions in a nation increasingly dominated by
"technocrats," it may well be that none of the areas-nor, for that
matter, others that might be mentioned-will receive serious concern.
That the social milieu in which the Court operates is ever changing
is an obvious truism-but one not sufficiently faced as yet.91  Dean
Don K. Price, in a seminal book,92 attributes the factor of change,
both in extent and in its rapidity, to the scientific revolution.
93
Science (and its by-product, technology) are creating situations which
pose fundamental problems to the nature of American democracy.
94
Public policies in the future, according to Dean Price, will be
determined more by scientific and technological developments we
cannot now foresee than by political (or legal) doctrines that we can
now state.95 The conditions of human existence have been altered
more in the past one hundred years than in all of previous human
history and the future portends even faster change.9 6  Already
government has undergone radical alterations from that condition
which existed as recently as 1900. The age of administration, of
bureaucracy, of planning has come; organizations dominate the
polity; the lines between public and private and between foreign and
domestic are being blurred.97 Legislatures and courts are nineteenth
century institutions, neither of which has demonstrated any high
degree of interest or ability in improving its methods to meet new
conditions.
92 Cf. Miller, Technology, Social Change, and the Constitution, 55 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 17, 19-20 (1964).
92 PRICE, TIE SCIENTIFIC EsTATE (1965), reviewed in Miller, Book Review, 1966
DuE L.J. 622.
981d. at 15-20.9' The scientific revolution is one of the vital forces "behind institutions, behind
constitutional form and modifications" which historian Frederick Jackson Turner
maintained called "these organs into life and shaped them to meet changing condi-
tions." TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HIsTORY 2 (1920). See Landynski, The
Making of Constitutional Law, 31 SOCIAL RFSEARCH 23 (1964).
'5 PRICE, op. cit. supra note 89, at 186.
90 See ibid.; COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL (1966); LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHooD
(1965).
'7Adumbrated in Miller, Constitutional Revolution Consolidated: The Rise of the
Positive State, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 172, 182-84 (1966).
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The three areas of possible judicial interest mentioned above
all involve, in greater or lesser degree, aspects of the scientific-
technological revolution. One may speak normatively and say that
the Supreme Court should not shy from the issues presented by them.
But we are not hopeful. That is a dour note on which to end this
commentary about the power of the Court; nevertheless, it does
seem to be justified. To make a prediction: the "activist" Court
presided over by Chief Justice Earl Warren will soon taper off into
relative desuetude.
By WAY OF CONCLUSION
The hypotheses suggested in this article are not to be considered
as anything more than tentative formulations. If empirically vali-
dated, they would go far toward showing that the symbolic view
of the Court and of the orthodox notion of the rule of law are not
requirements of a viable legal order. The point we should like
to emphasize, however, is not that Professor Mishkin's analysis and
conclusions are shaky. Rather it is that further intuiting of con-
clusions about the Supreme Court, usually based upon nothing more
than casuistical exercises on Court opinions, will not serve the needs
of scholarship or, of far greater importance, of that greater under-
standing of adjudication which will at once permit higher levels of
attainment by bench and bar and result in maintenance of the
Court's position in the power structure of American government.
As matters stand now, we suggest, the Court is on the verge of a
considerable diminution of power vis-4-vis the avowedly political
branches of government. That would be a tragedy, for it seems clear
beyond peradventure that the High Bench, if it seizes the oppor-
tunities, could have a role, however immeasurable, to play in helping
effect the nexus between a proliferating government and the indi-
vidual on the one hand and between the pluralistic centers of power
in American society and the individual (and also as between those
centers of power and government) on the other.
The Court will not be able to accomplish these objectives unless
and until is it institutionally buttressed. If law, as Frankfurter said,
"presupposes sociological wisdom as well as logical unfolding,"0 8 the
Court must have the assistance necessary to make sociologically wise
98Frankfurter, The Process of Judging in Constitutional Cases, in AN AUTO-
BIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 267, 270 (Westin ed. 1963).
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decisions in a dynamic social milieu. On this score, one should
not be at all optimistic, for the likelihood is that little meaningful
will be done. Perhaps incremental improvements will come about,
possibly through expanded use of amici curiae briefs but more
probably only as individual Justices perceive and act upon the need.
But that will not suffice. Just as it has become evident in recent
years that Congress must reorganize itself if it is to retain its
present power, attenuated though it may be)9 so too the Supreme
Court and commentators must recognize that the adversary system-
the product of private-law litigation in an agricultural, even feudal
society-and the declaratory theory are simply not adequate in the
modern era. What type of improvements or changes should be made
we only partially suggest. However, just as there is a vital need for
factual studies of the legal order,100 including constitutional adjudi-
cation, a concomitant requirement exists for the invention of new
techniques and new aids for the nine men whose fate it is to sit upon
the Supreme Court of the United States. The American people by
and large do seem still to be willing to permit the Court to make
its ostensibly portentous pronouncements upon public policy, and
thus to wield some political power. How long this will continue
we do not predict.
The new constitutional order which has become so familiar in
recent years, following the watershed year of 1937, has produced a
government of affirmative responsibility-the Positive State. Exem-
plified in many legislative and administrative programs, it is the
American version of the welfare state. During this period the
Supreme Court, without announcement and without fanfare but
with considerable controversy, has been engaged in working out
an affirmative set of constitutional concepts. 101 The Positive State
requires such a positive jurisprudence. If, as Woodrow Wilson said,
"constitutions must be Darwinian in structure and practice," so
too must the institutions of government. The Supreme Court must
be ready and able to meet the challenges of the unknown future.
99 See, e.g., THE CoNGRss AND AluEncA's FuTuRE (Truman ed. 1965).
100 See, e.g., SCMMERT (ed.), JUDiCiAL BEHAVIOR 4 (1964); Kommers, Professor
Kurland, the Supreme Court, and Political Science, 15 J. PUB. L. 280 (1966).
201 Cf. Rosrow, THE SovmE.Iau'PREROGATIVE (1962).
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